Why Simon Property Group (Probably) Won’t Go Bankrupt

The March selloff provided some opportunities to buy undervalued stocks. One of the stocks I scooped up was Simon Property Group, which on the surface appears to be a risky business. However, the assumption I’m making is that the majority of tenants will continue to pay their rent through this COVID19 crisis. Since this is a big assumption, I decided to dig into Simon’s financials, model what would happen if a chunk of their tenants fail to pay rent, and try to prove why SPG won’t go bankrupt.

Estimating SPGs Finances During COVID19

Now let’s do some back of the envelope calculations to model what SPGs finances may be this year. Simon Property Group’s simplified income statement and balance sheet are shown below. In this exercise, we assume a scenario where a large portion of tenants don’t pay rent, however we have to balance being conservative with being realistic. First, let’s say that there is a 30% reduction in revenue from tenants not paying or going bankrupt. Factoring in the 30% haircut from last year’s revenue, this would mean an estimated 2020 revenue of $4B.

SPG 2019 Simplified Income Statement (Dollars in Thousands)
Total Revenue5,755,189
Expenses
Property Operating453,145
Depreciation and Amortization1,340,503
Real Estate Taxes 468,004
Repairs and Maintenance100,495
Advertising and Promotion150,344
Home and Regional Office Costs190,109
General and Administrative34,860 
Other109,898
Total Operating Expenses2,847,358
Interest Expense (789,353)
SPG 2019 Simplified Balance Sheet(Dollars in Thousands)
Assets
Investment Properties Less Depreciation23,898,719 
Cash and Cash Equivalents669,373
Liabilities
Mortgages and Unsecured Indebtedness24,163,230

Breaking Down Expenses

Even though the revenues may be down because of the COVID19 crisis, expenses may be fairly fixed. The next line on the income statement shows SPG had operating expenses amounting to $2.9B in 2019. Operating expenses consist of property operating cost, real estate taxes, repairs, advertising, office costs, employee costs, and depreciation. Some of these expenses could be cut, but that would probably equate to a couple hundred million which won’t move the needle too much. Above all, the largest cost is depreciation, which is a non-cash expense. Depreciation spreads the cost of certain purchases over a period of several years, instead of charging the full cost upfront. Since we are primarily worried about cash flow coming in and out, we can add back depreciation, resulting in an adjusted operating expense of $1.5B.

Operating and Net Income

Now that we estimated expenses, we can find the operating income by subtracting the adjusted operating expenses ($1.5B) from the estimated revenue ($4B). This leads to an estimated operating income of $2.5B. Following the operating income are a series of line items that arrive at the net income. Examples of these items are income tax, income from unconsolidated entities, and unrealized losses on assets. For simplicity sake, let’s ignore these since they won’t change the outcome much. The last line item we care about is the interest expense, which amounts to about $800M this year. 

Current Liabilities

A common metric used to judge a businesses credit worthiness is the interest coverage ratio. This is calculated by dividing the operating income by the interest expense. For instance, an interest coverage ratio below 1.5 indicates the company may have difficulties paying their interest if there is a bump in the road. Calculating the interest coverage ratio for SPG, with the estimated operating 2020 expense, yields 3.16. In short, Simon should be able to make its interest payments this year.

With the income and expenses tallied up, it is time to look at the liquid assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. So far we estimated the amount of cash coming into SPG this year, but we have to factor the cash already on hand. During the period ending in 2019, Simon has $670M in cash. There are some accounts receivables and payables, but let’s pretend they cancel each other out for simplicity. 

Long Term Debt

The most important piece of info needed to judge SPGs financial strength is the amount of debt they owe. Currently, SPG has $24B in debt, with $6B of it in mortgages, and $18B in unsecured debt such as bonds, commercial. paper and credit facilities. As previously mentioned, interest on the debt is about $800M this year. Some of the bonds and the commercial paper come due this year, which means the principle needs to be repaid. Finally, the amount of debt coming due this year is $2.9B.

The big question is whether or not Simon can pay off the debt coming due this year, and make its interest payments with reduced revenue. The good news is that in March, SPG received an increase in their credit facility. They now have about $9B in credit they can tap into to pay their liabilities. Obviously it isn’t ideal to use debt to pay debt, but these are circumstances beyond their control.

Calculating SPG’s Deficit

Putting it all together, we can estimate how much of a cash surplus or shortfall SPG will have this year after paying its debts. The equation below shows that by adding the estimated operating income and the current cash balance, then subtract interest and debt coming due, Simon will approximately have a $500M deficit. 

Estimated Operating Income + CashInterestDebt Due = -500M

While it is not ideal that SPG will more than likely suffer a loss this year, they can easily cover this deficit with their credit facilities. Therefore, based on these rough calculations, I believe Simon Property Group will be able to weather this rough 2020.

Other things to consider are Simon’s debt covenants may be a limiting factor on how they can navigate this crisis. However, I couldn’t find much detail on their covenants. One can assume that if they had a large increase in their credit facility, then they must not be close to violating the covenants. 

Simon’s Dividend

Another note is that this analysis did not take into account Simon’s dividend. REITS must payout a large portion of their profits, however I doubt Simon will be profitable in 2020. Although some investors would probably prefer SPG to maintain the dividend as much as possible, I believe the smart thing to do would be to cut the dividend if this year is indeed economically bad. In other words,I would be a bit disappointed if SPG tapped into their debt to maintain the dividend. 

Conclusion

In summary, it appears that SPGs $9B credit facility can provide a life jacket during this pandemic. These calculations are based on a 30% reduction in rental income, which seems harsh but not out of the realm of possibility. If every retail company goes bankrupt or doesn’t pay rent, then I guess it’s force majeure and we must be in a depression.  Therefore, in my view, there is a good amount of evidence to show why SPG won’t go bankrupt.

Let me know if I’m missing something crucial! I by no means claim to be a competent analyst.

March Stock Purchases

It’s been a while since I’ve bought individual stocks, but the March sell off has me scrambling to scoop up some good deals. My aim for these discretionary stock picks is to find quality companies trading at attractive free cash flow yields. Each position I bought in March make up approximately 5% of my portfolio. So far, I’ve bought Capital One, Simon Property Group, and Emerson Electric. I believe all of these are quality businesses, however they are not without their short term troubles. 

Capital One Financial

Capital One Financial Corp (COF) was the first purchase during the recent market selloff. Capital One is a diversified financial company providing consumer lending, commercial lending, and commercial banking. COF is one of the 10 largest banks based on deposits, and third largest credit card issuer. The business model is to lend money to consumers and businesses from capital received by bank deposits. 

The founder of Capital One, Richard Fairbank, is still the CEO of the company. Managers that are founders is a trait I like in businesses because I believe their interests are better aligned with all the stakeholders, and are more likely to be above average capital allocators. Capital One used its strong balance sheet to make acquisitions during the 2008 financial crisis, so I have confidence they can navigate this current market turmoil. 

The main risks to COF are low interest rates, which compresses the spread between the interest they receive from lending and the interest they must pay on deposits. The falling interest rate trend has impacted most bank stock valuations. During a recession, default rates and charge off rates could increase. While COF has reserves for increased defaults, it could temporarily affect earnings. Another reason for Capital One’s lower valuation is the recent data breach that occured in 2019. 

The table below shows my purchase price, and some of the key metrics I use to evaluate a business. Typically I don’t use Price to Book value, but it can be useful to valuing financial companies. A stock trading below its book value, a P/B less than 1, is a sign of undervaluation.

Purchase Price$63.25
FCF Yield52%
P/B0.5
D/E0.95
RoE9.5%

Simon Property Group

The second stock I bought in March was Simon Property Group (SPG), a mall REIT. Owning a bunch of shopping malls sounds like a terrible idea since the narrative is that brick and mortar retail is dead. While I think many malls will close, I believe this will be concentrated on the lower class malls in unattractive markets. SPG owns 204 properties, including 106 malls and 69 premium outlet malls. These properties are located in major metro areas such as Miami, Boston, San Jose, and Las Vegas. The quality properties in great markets should allow SPG to continue to provide steady cash flow to shareholders. Simon has the highest credit rating for a REIT, pays an average interest rate of 3.3% on its debt, and has a 5.3x interest coverage ratio. 

SPG share price has been heavily beaten up from the Retail Apocalypse narrative, and now COVID19 fears. I believe these fears are overblown. Yes online shopping will continue to grow, but I believe brands will still want some physical locations as a showroom for their products. Since 2017, SPGs occupancy rate has only fallen 0.5%, to an occupancy rate of 95.3%. During this same period, base rents have increased. SPG is focusing on providing not only shopping, but dining and entertainment options to diversify the experience. As for the COVID19 concerns, it is possible some corporate tenants will not be able to pay their rent. However, I do not think it is likely that more than 50% of tenants are going to break their lease, or go bankrupt. It is my belief that Simon will be producing healthy cash flows two years from now despite a near term rough patch. If I’m wrong, then we are probably in the Great Depression 2.0 and have bigger things to worry about. 

The table below shows my purchase price and key metrics used to judge the quality of the business. The debt to equity is high for this company because it owns real estate with mortgages. The return on equity is very high because the debt allows SPG to own a large amount of income producing assets. This debt means there is relatively low amount of equity, thereby creating a large RoE. 

Purchase Price$74.50
FCF Yield13%
D/E9.4
RoE73%

Emerson Electric

Emerson Electric (EMR) is a diversified industrial company consisting of climate technologies, automation solutions, and tools & home product segments. Climate technologies include residential heating and cooling, commercial air conditioning, commercial and industrial refrigeration. The tools & home products segment makes professional tools, food disposal systems (such as its InSinkErator brand), electric water heaters, among others. Both the climate technologies, and tools & home products segments are low growth, almost commodity type products. What makes me interested in EMR is the automation segment, that provides measurement instruments, fluid control, process control, and Industrial Internet of Things solutions. This segment should provide Emerson with a runway of modest growth in the future. One application of EMRs automation products is in the oil industry, with computer controlled valves, pumps, flow rate sensors that accurately measure the transfer of oil in custodial transactions. 

The main risks to EMR are a general economic slowdown, and slowdown in the oil industry specifically. While EMR is quite diversified, the shale oil recession in 2016 impacted Emersons automation segment. Going forward EMR could face near term headwinds with the economic slowdown from COVID19, as well as the collapse in oil prices. Despite this, I believe Emerson is a high quality company that is rarely undervalued. 

It can be seen from the table that EMR appears to be a quality company that can produce healthy returns on equity, while having a strong balance sheet.

Purchase Price$31
FCF Yield13%
D/E0.48
RoE26%