Stock Analysis: Brown-Forman

Introduction

Lately I’ve been investigating high quality companies so that I can be prepared during the next market selloff. Union Pacific was the first company I analyzed in this quest. Now in this post, I am analyzing Brown-Forman (I may have sampled some of their products for “research”). What I’m trying to understand is the business model, the company’s products, analyze the financials, and try to do a rough valuation. The goal is to determine if I should put Brown-Forman on my watchlist, or pass on it for a different idea.

Business Description

Brown-Forman (BF) is one of the largest American spirits companies. BF owns a portfolio of brands, but is most known for their Jack Daniels whiskey. The company is family controlled and has two share classes. The family controls most of BF-A which has all the voting power, while BF-B does not have any voting power. Brown-Forman is headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky. The company was founded in 1870, and went public in 1933, so it’s been around for a while. 

For a quick history lesson, Brown-Forman’s first product was Old Forester whiskey. Their claim to fame is that Old Forester was the first whiskey to be sold in a sealed glass bottle. Early on, the company bought whiskey from other distilleries and blended them for sale. Eventually, BF purchased their own distillery plant. In the 1950’s, Brown-Forman purchased the Jack Daniels brand, which is now a huge brand. I find it interesting that Old Forester was BF’s original brand, but now Jack Daniel’s is the core of the company. 

Product Line

Brown-Forman has many brands spread across the different types of liquor. The following is just the highlights of BF’s product line. Whiskey forms the core of the company, with Jack Daniels. There is also Old Forester, the premium Woodford Reserve line, and the low-end Early Times. Brown-Forman also owns the well known Canandian Mist brand, but they are in the process of selling it. Fairly recently, BF has acquired several scotch distilleries that includes the BenRiach, GlenDronach, and Glenglassaugh brands. 

The company owns a California winery, Sonoma-Cutrer, as well as Korbel sparkling wine. In the vodka department BF has the Finlandia brand. As for tequila, they have the el Jimador and Herradura brands. 

The Jack Daniel’s “Ready to Drink” products are like a cocktail in a can. These are geared towards younger people to introduce the Jack Daniel’s brand. 

The past few years have seen different Jack Daniel’s flavors such as honey or apple being released that have boosted growth. Then you have all the various whiskey age/barrell variety combinations such as Woodford Reserve Double Oak.

Summary Statistics

The table shows various summary statistics of Brown-Forman. The company is about $30B in size, which makes it a mid-cap these days? The valuation ratios indicate that BF is pretty expensive, which we’ll get to later. Right now, the price of Brown-Forman is around $70 a share, but during the March 2020 selloff it was near $50. Return on equity is at 37%, suggesting this is a quality company. The debt levels are fairly reasonable with a D/E around 1 and Debt/EBITDA around 2. Some might say Brown-Forman could/should increase their debt load a bit since they are a quality company and interest rates are low. However I tend to prefer less debt. I’m estimating earnings growth around 4% based on historical growth. I’m not making any fancy projections, but slightly above inflation seems reasonable.

Market Capitalization$32B
Enterprise Value$34B
P/E36
EV/EBIT33
52 Week Price$52-82
ROE37%
D/E1.07
Debt/EBITDA1.98
Earnings Growth~4%

Financials

Here I summarize Brown-Forman’s financials based on their income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement. I believe that taking a look at a company’s financials is key before making an investment.

Income Statement

In 2020 Brown-Forman produced revenue of $3.36 billion. It should be noted that their fiscal year ends in April, so these financials are only showing the beginning of the pandemic. Looking at the profit margins, we see a gross margin at 61%, operating margin of 31%, and a net margin of 27%. These are definitely attractive margins, which further supports that BF is a high quality company.

The income statement is summarized in the pie chart below where the entire pie is Brown-Forman’s revenue. It can be seen that the cost of goods sold and SG&A are the main expenses. Income tax, interest, and depreciation make up a pretty small slice of expenses. In summary, the income statement looks pretty straightforward with a healthy net income. 

Assets

Next, let’s take a look at Brown-Forman’s balance sheet. The assets are broken down in the chart below (some smaller line items are omitted for clarity). The first thing to note is the $1.1B in cash, making up about 17% of their assets. Inventory is recorded at $1.72B. It’s a bit funny thinking about $1.7 billion in liquor sitting around. The rest of the assets appear reasonable with property and plant taking up a decent chunk. The amount of intangibles is expected from a company with strong brands. Finally, there is some goodwill, reflecting the acquisitions BF has made. The high cash balance would seem to support a strong balance sheet, and the rest of the assets are as you would expect. 

Liabilities

For the liabilities side of Brown-Forman’s balance sheet, the main line item is the $2.3B in long term debt. This amount of debt is fine since there is $1.1B in cash available that could wipe out most of it. Short term debt is at $312M, which most of it was raised in 2020. The other thing to note from Brown-Forman’s liabilities is the pension liability, which most companies these days don’t provide a pension. Like the assets, there is nothing out of the ordinary or any red flags with BF’s liabilities. 

Cash Flow

The table belows shows a simplified view of Brown-Forman’s cash flow statement. Looking at 2019 and 2020, BF’s operating cash flow is between $700-800M. In both years, capex is about the same being around $120M. It would be useful to find out if this is maintenance capex, or used to build new PP&E that could provide growth. There were no acquisitions in 2019, but a small one in 2020. 

Cash from financing first consists of raising $178M of short term debt in 2020. Buybacks were performed in 2019 to the tune of $207M, but none were during 2020. Brown-Forman seems to do sporadic buybacks so I’m not sure if the lack of buybacks in 2020 is COVID related, or just coincidence. Finally, in both years the dividend is a bit north of $300, with BF maintaining their record of increasing their dividend annually. Brown-Forman’s cash flow statement is pretty straightforward. The cash flow statement can provide good insights on the company’s capital allocation, so the simpler the better. 

($M)20202019
Cash From Operations724800
Capex(113)(119)
Acquisition(22)0
Cash From Investing(141)(119)
Short Term Debt17871
Buyback(1)(207)
Dividend(325)(310)
Cash From Financing(191)(599)
Change in Cash36868

Capital Allocation

A company’s capital allocation strategy is key to having strong long term performance. Here I will try to summarize Brown-Forman’s capital allocation based on my light research. In 2016, BF sold the popular Southern Comfort brand. The company is currently in the process of selling Canadian Mist. I find it interesting that BF is selling these well known brands, but presumably they are selling them for an attractive price. On the other hand, Brown-Forman has been acquiring assets such as the scotch brands, and the recent acquisition of Ford’s gin. It appears BF has a thought out strategy to reorient their portfolio of brands. 

The other key area of capital allocation is return profits back to shareholders. As mentioned above, BF repurchased $207M shares in 2019. Oddly, BF did not repurchase any shares in 2018, but did buyback $571M in 2017. The large 2017 repurchase may be due to the sale of Southern Comfort in 2016. I’m not sure if Brown-Forman is only buying back their share at what they think are attractive prices, or if there is another reason for these sporadic purchases. 

On the dividend front, Brown-Forman is a dividend aristocrat, consistently paying a dividend for 76 years, and raising the dividend for 37 straight years. While sometimes it can be suboptimal to pay a dividend, Brown-Forman is a high quality, low growing company, so it seems reasonable. The dividend payout ratio is 37%, which leaves the company with plenty of retained earnings to reinvest.

Brown-Forman Valuation

Oftentimes when I value a company, I use a basic discounted cash flow analysis to get a rough fair value. Looking at Brown-Forman’s free cash flow the past few years, a reasonable figure to use in the DCF is about $700M. For the growth rate, I’m using 4% based on BF’s past growth. This growth rate is slightly above inflation, which seems appropriate. Typically, I would use a 10% discount rate, but doing so for Brown-Forman would produce a much lower fair value than what the stock is trading at. In this case, I reverse engineered what discount rate the market is implying. The discount rate I came up with is 4.5%. This is a very low discount rate. However BF is a quality stock, so it makes sense that the market would be discounting it slightly above the risk free rate. 

Putting all these variables together, we get a fair value around $65 which is near what the stock is trading at today. The 4.5% discount rate implies that if you bought it today, you would expect to receive a 4.5% return by holding for the long term. This rate of return is far lower than I would be trying to achieve.

But you have to consider that I’m competing against pension funds, endowments, and other institutional investors that are willing to accept lower returns. These funds need a replacement for bonds since interest rates are so low. Therefore, they look at quality companies as an alternative, bidding up the valuation. A quality company that is slightly growing, paying a little dividend, and doing some share buybacks is a lot more attractive than a bond yielding 2%. So all that to say, Brown-Forman is not currently attractive for me, but I understand why it is at this valuation.

Buying the Dip

While Brown-Forman does not provide the most attractive return at its current price, occasionally the stock sells off like March 2020. During that period, BF dropped to about $50 a share. If you were lucky enough to buy it at this low price, you would experience about a 40% gain as the stock reverted back to $70. A 40% gain, then compounding at 4.5% into the future, should produce a decent internal rate of return if held for 5 years or so. Obviously this only works if the stock reverts back to its prior valuation. My conclusion is that if I were to buy some Brown-Forman, I would wait until there was a panic and Mr. Market could offer me a once in ~7 year deal.  

Brown-Forman During Inflation

Another aspect I want to consider is how Brown-Forman would perform during an inflationary period. On one hand, BF’s multiple could compress if interest rates go from low to high(er). Since Brown-Forman is so richly valued because of low interest rates, if rates increased then investors would have to increase their discount rates. It would seem reasonable that the share price of BF would take a hit during this period.

On the other hand, Brown-Forman should be able to easily increase the price of its products during an inflationary period. While i need to do more research, I would think that people buying liquor are pretty price insensitive, especially when all brands would be raising prices with inflation. Another point is that BF does not have heavy capex needs. Companies that have to constantly overhaul their factories would be forced to pay ever increasing prices for equipment during inflation. 

Based on this, it is possible that Brown-Forman’s business would do ok during an inflationary environment, but the stock price could languish. Perhaps if this scenario played out, it would be a good opportunity to dollar cost average into the company. 

Business Risks

While Brown-Forman is a quality company, there are still a few risks worth further researching. One unique problem with liquor is that some of the products need to be aged for 5+ years. This means you have to predict what demand will be like far into the future, which is hard. Over the past 10 years, whiskey has been trendy. If the trend passes, then demand could be much lower in the future. 

The Jack Daniel’s brand is vital to Brown-Forman. If somehow, the Jack Daniel’s brand fell from grace, then BF would be in some hard times. 

In 2018 the EU enacted tariffs against Jack Daniel’s in retaliation to the Trump administration’s tariffs on steel. I guess they targeted Jack Daniel’s since it is a quintessential American brand. Apparently the EU tariffs are supposed to double in June 2021 if the trade relations do not approve.

Government regulation could negatively impact Brown-Forman. Alcohol has tricky advertising regulations across different countries. Governments could also impose gaudier warnings labels, which could affect sales.

Finally, I have anecdotally heard that cannabis could take market share from liquor companies. I don’t know anything about the cannabis industry, but this threat seems somewhat reasonable. On the flip side, I guess nothing stops Brown-Forman from making a cannabis infused tequila or something.   

Conclusion

After analyzing Brown-Forman, I can definitely say that it is a quality company. I would love to own this business, but the valuation is an issue. The best hope to make the type of return that I seek is to wait for a market panic and hope that BF’s price reverts back to normal levels. Given this reality, I am curious if any of the other quality companies in my pipeline will prove to be more attractive than Brown-Forman.

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Stock Analysis: Union Pacific

What Drew Me to Railroads

Lately I have been wanting to analyze quality companies so that when they become cheap during the market sell off, I can make a quick buy decision. Railroads were at the top of my list of a business that I wanted to do a deep dive on. I decided to analyze the financials of Union Pacific Railroad (UNP) because they are the largest railroad in the US.

There are several reasons why I’m interested in railroads. First, they’ve been around for 200 years, so they haven’t gone obsolete yet. Railroads enjoy network effects and barriers to entry. It would be nearly impossible to build all new rail lines. Locomotives are also the most efficient way to transport goods across land. Because of these factors, I believe railroads have one of the strongest moats out there.

Qualitative factors aren’t the only reasons to invest in a company, you need to take a look at their financials. When something jumps out at me in UNPs financials, I tried to dig deeper to find an explanation. I documented my train of thought in this post, basically asking questions and trying to draw conclusions. Also, I tried to include a good amount of charts to help visualize trends in the financial statements. In the end, I feel like I have a much clearer understanding of Union Pacific’s business.   

Why is FCF CAGR Higher Than Revenue?

One of the first things I take a look at when analyzing a company is the growth rate of revenue, operating income, operating cash flow, FCF, etc. The chart below shows UNP’s 10 year revenue, cash flow from operations, and free cash flow. Over the past ten years, revenue has grown at a CAGR of 1.6%. Revenue grew at a steady pace from 2010 to 2014. At first I wondered if it was due to bouncing back from the 2008 recession. However, revenue was $18B in 2008, fell to $13.3B in 2009, then was back to $17B in 2010. 

The revenue growth is probably due to the shale energy boom that was going on back then. A decent chunk of Union Pacific’s revenues comes from transporting frac sand, and the resulting crude, natural gas, and finished products. When oil prices plummeted in 2015, domestic oil production was curtailed. The shale oil bust helps explain UNP’s decline in revenues since 2014.

Despite the low revenue growth, operating cash flow has grown by 3.8% and FCF has grown by 7.9%. The fact that these cash flows have outpaced revenue growth warrants some more investigation. Over a long time horizon, it doesn’t make economic sense that profits would grow faster than the revenue the business is bringing in. Union Pacific’s growth of cash flow from operations can be explained by the improvement of the operating ratio, which I will touch on in a bit. 

Since the free cash flow is the operating cash flow, minus capex, it will grow in tandem with the operating cash flow. Additionally, since the free cash flow has outpaced operating cash flow, this implies that capex has proportionally decreased over the course of the past ten years. Looking at the cash flow statement, capex has been about flat for the past 5 years.  

Operating Ratio

One of the key metrics used to judge the performance of a railroad is its operating ratio. The operating ratio is simply the operating expenses divided by the revenue. A lower ratio implies the railroad is more efficient, so it’s a never ending quest to lower the ratio. 

The chart below shows the operating ratio from 2006-2020. The 80% operating ratio in 2006 seems pretty inefficient compared to the 60% of recent years. This large improvement in efficiency is a large factor of how Union Pacific’s cash flow from operations has grown so fast. Revenue has grown at a mediocre rate, but expenses have dramatically fallen. 

Honing in on the next chart, we see individually UNP’s revenue and expenses. Something I noticed was that revenue started growing faster than expenses around 2009 until 2014. Since then revenue and expenses have more or less moved in tandem. 

As someone who is potentially interested in owning railroads, I would hope that the operating ratio continues to decline. Union Pacific has declared that their goal is to reach an unheard of 55% ratio. This is a worthy goal, and there are probably efficiencies to be gained from automation and technology. UNP began the Precision Railroading concept in 2018, which should continue to reduce expenses. However, an investor should be cognizant of the possibility that there are diminishing returns in efficiency, or operating income deteriorates somehow (wages, fuel prices increase, more capex?). As an amateur railroad analyst, I have no idea how likely it would be that expenses increase. A stagnant, or increasing operating ratio would impact other areas of UNP’s business, which I will touch on later. 

Return on Equity

Here I want to briefly look at UNP’s return on equity. In the chart you can see that ROE steadily went from around 10% in 2006 to about 20% in 2016. Then in 2017, Union Pacific’s ROE spiked to 43%, then fell closer to 30% the past couple of years. These large jumps are due to the railroads change in equity due to a large increase in net income in 2017. The large net income increase was due to the tax cuts. UNP paid about $3 billion in taxes for 2016, but was refunded about $3 billion in 2017. In general, UNP’s upward trend in ROE is from increasing net income, as well as decreasing shareholder equity (which I’ll touch on in a minute).

Why Has D/E Increased Lately?

A company’s debt-to-equity ratio is one of the key metrics I look at to gauge the strength of the balance sheet. Typically I would want a company to have a D/E below 1.0, unless they have very stable earnings. A high debt-to-equity value means the business has a large debt burden, which could mortally wound them during a rough patch in the economy. Seeing the spike in the D/E for UNP required me to dig in further. 

UNP Debt

From 2005 to 2014, UNP’s D/E has been around a safe 0.5. More recently, the debt-to-equity ratio has ramped up, ending 2020 at 1.5. These values are fairly high, and the sharp trend upward is a bit concerning. Starting in 2012, UNP has been ramping up debt issuance. Over the last 5 years, they have issued an average of $2.8 billion in debt per year. 

UNP Equity

On the equity side, we have seen earlier that shareholders equity has steadily decreased. When the denominator (debt) is increasing and the numerator (equity) is decreasing, it makes sense that the D/E has tripled. Digging into the equity a little more, the two key line items are retained earnings and treasury stock. Retained earnings are steadily increasing, going from $17.15B in 2010 to $51.3B in 2020. This is good because it means the company is consistently profitable. 

Treasury stock is the placeholder value for the cumulative dollar amount of share the company has bought back. These share buybacks are considered negative equity, so they count against the shareholder equity value. Treasury stock has gone from -$4B in 2010, to -$40.4B in 2020. The growth in treasury stock, aka their share buybacks, is what is greatly decreasing Union Pacific’s equity. So the key takeaway here is the UNP is increasing debt, while also reducing their equity through share buybacks. This is causing the dramatic rise in D/E. The reduction in equity also explains the recent elevated ROE.   

Shareholder Return

As we saw by analyzing the ROE and D/E, UNP is reducing their equity through share buybacks. This is usually beneficial to shareholders, so we can calculate shareholder return. Shareholder return is calculated by adding the dividends paid and the dollar amount of share buybacks. You can then convert this to a per share basis, and figure out your yield based on the price paid for the stock.

These values can be found on the cash flow statement. Here we find that in 2020, UNP paid out $2.63B in dividends while spending $3.71B buying back shares, for a total shareholder return of $6.34B. As a note in 2020 UNP reduced their buybacks by about $1B compared to the previous year. On a per share basis, shareholder return was $9.34 a share. Looking at the past 5 years, we can round a bit and say that UNP has spent $2B in dividends and $5B in buying back shares. 

Analyzing the cash flow statement further, we can see that the 2020 free-cash flow per share is $8.26. This is an interesting observation because it means UNP is returning more cash to shareholders, than what the operating business is generating. How is this done? UNP is able to do this by constantly issuing debt. Luckily this is cheap debt. However it would seem reasonable that UNP can not return more cash to shareholders than the business produces forever.

Debt Limits

How long can Union Pacific continue to reward shareholders by issuing debt? Well that is tough to answer, but probably comes down to the risk tolerance of management and the shareholders, UNP’s debt covenants, interest rate levels, and the company’s earnings power. As I mentioned earlier, typically I prefer a D/E ratio below 1.0, however the management may feel comfortable at a higher level since interest rates are low. If that is the case, I would have to decide if I think the stock could weather a recession with that debt load.

I did a little digging into Union Pacific’s debt covenants. At one point in their 10-K, UNP mentions they can not surpass a Debt/EBITDA ratio of 3.5. In their most recent earnings presentation, UNP stated their Debt/EBITDA ratio increased from 2.5 in 2019 to 2.9 in 2020. I’m not sure what a reasonable Debt/EBITDA ratio is for a railroad, but it seems 3.5 is getting into the danger zone. We already observed that debt has been increasing at about $3-5B a year. On the EBITDA side, it has not really increased in the last several years. If this trend continues, then it seems reasonable that UNP will hit their Debt/EBITDA limit of 3.5 within the next few years. 

Union Pacific’s Future Shareholder Return 

Going forward, it looks like Union Pacific has to increase their earning power to keep the share buyback train going, or eventually slow down the debt issuance and pay down their current debts. The increasing earnings power plan could be a realistic outcome. That is where our friend the operating ratio comes back into play. If UNP can go from an operating ratio of 60% down to 55%, that will provide more EBITDA to keep them under their debt covenant. My naive guess is that there are plenty of efficiency gains to be had from technology and automation. The spoiler would be if expenses increased for some reason, such as fuel cost or labor cost. 

If Union Pacific’s earnings power does not materially increase, then eventually they will hit a point where they need to deleverage. The least painful scenario would be to not increase share buybacks/shareholder return every year. Then as earnings grow, the excess can be used to pay down the debt. The more painful situation would be UNP reducing its shareholder return in order to reduce its debt level. If investors are used to getting a relatively high return through dividends and buybacks, they will most likely react negatively if those are dialed back. 

What Management is Saying

In Union Pacific’s Q3 earnings call, the management indicated they wanted to reduce debt by $800M in Q4 2020. Looking at their Q4 cash flow statement, $1.22B of debt was paid down in the fourth quarter. Management mentioned in their Q4 earnings call that they would dial back up their share buy backs in 2021 since they let their foot off the gas in 2020. It seems to me like there is some mixed messaging from the management about recently wanting to pay down debt, while at the same time wanting to ramp up buybacks in 2021.

Wrapping Things Up

After digging into Union Pacific’s financials, it leaves me a bit torn. Qualitatively, UNP is a strong company with a wide moat. Railroads provide efficient transportation, and it is nearly impossible to build competing networks. However, to me it seems like this quality operating business is wrapped in a layer of financial engineering. UNP is able to take out cheap debt, then pay more in dividends and buybacks than the cash the business generates. This seems to be a common occurrence with blue-chip companies in this era of cheap debt.

This strategy has worked out very well for the last 5+ years. I wish I would have bought some stock back then. I am worried that the party has to end eventually. Maybe UNP has a few years ahead before they have to reel back the debt. In the meantime, the stock price could continue to perform very well. However, if you’re looking to buy UNP and hold indefinitely, you may have to endure a little rough patch whenever they deleverage. I wanted to believe in Union Pacific, but I think I’ll watch on the sidelines for a bit to see how things play out.

For more value investing content check out:

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